Bhadas ब्लाग में पुराना कहा-सुना-लिखा कुछ खोजें.......................


सिंगापुर और कुछ देशों की भ्रष्टाचार से लड़ाई कैसे लड़ी .

प्रिय ब्लोगी मित्रों , 

मुझे पता है आप सब भ्रष्टाचार के प्रति चिंतित हैं . जब मनमोहन चिंतित हैं तो समझो सारा देश चिंतित है .  

हम बड़ी बड़ी दिमागी कुलाचे भर रहे हैं.  पर जो व्यक्ति अंग्रेजी जानते हैं, उन्हें ये लेख जरूर पर्हना चाहिए , 

यह वर्ल्ड बैंक की और से लिखा गया है .  

पूरा लेख लिंक पर उपलब्ध है 

how singapore and other countries fight corruption :

this is a wonderful ,concise report about the corruption ending case study of some countries, including singapore. 

this is a fantastic report : 

Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption? 
John R. Heilbrunn 
2004. 21 pages. Stock No. 37234

                 link :

Introduction     1 
Hong Kong’s ICAC: The Universal Model     3
Singapore’s CPIB: the Investigative Model     5
The New South Wales ICAC: the Parliamentary Model     7
The United States Office of Government Ethics: the Multi-Agency Model     9
Other Experiences     10
Unraveling the Puzzle     13
Conclusion     14
Endnotes     16

worthful notings : 


Anti-corruption agencies are part of a number of strategies that together can reduce venality in a 
government. Some of these strategies are absolutely crucial, including 
first the independence of a commission. 

Second, commissions need a clear reporting hierarchy that comprises executive 
officials, parliamentary authorities, and oversight committees. 

Third, governments must have a commitment to enact reforms that may be politically difficult. How a government is able to enact 
these strategies requires negotiations among key actors in the government, civil society, and the 

Second, a commission must be independent from interference by the political leadership.

 In some circumstances, a commission linked to the executive branch is used to settle old scores with 
political rivals. When the agency is linked only to the Parliament, then the security agencies have 
a disincentive to include parliamentary committees in their investigations. A competitive 
relationship may evolve among parliamentarians and national crime investigators. The anticorruption commission thereby loses credibility as nothing more than a tool of the parliament.
Third, a clear reporting hierarchy may seem elementary, but it is not a straightforward arranagement. An optimal a hierarchy might be reports delivered to the director of the 
organization, \